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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH, BY AND
THROUGH UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT
OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No. 18988

Vs.
JOHN DICK,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal to determine the appropriate forum for enforcement of a child's right for care and support from its father,
pursuant to U.C.A. §78-45a-l et seq., when the father is under 18
years of age.
DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT
The State of Utah, Department of Social Services, filed suit
against Defendant-Appellant in Third District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah.

Defendant-Appellant filed a Motion for

an Order Releasing Jurisdiction to the Juvenile Court.

Said Motion

was denied by Order of the Third District Court Judge, Timothy R.
Hanson.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the Third District Court's
ruling and Order.

-2-

STATEHENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with the Statement of Facts recited by
Appellant in Part A and B of his Statement with the exception that
the Complaint does not, nor has Respondent ever, alleged that Appel_
ant has "violated" the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity.
ARGUMENT
THIS ACTION DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE
JUVENILE COURT, BUT IS PROPERLY BROUGHT IN THE DISTRICT COURT.
The present action against Appellant is a civil proceeding
pursuant to U.C.A.

§78-45a-l, et seq., the Uniform Act on Paternity
It is not a criminal action nor a quasi-criminal

action that corresponded to U.C.A.
(repealed 1980).

§77-60-1 et seq., Bastardy Act

This Court has consistently recognized that paterm:

suits are civil in nature; even when brought pursuant to the now
repealed Bastardy Act. See eg, Brown v. Marrelli, 527 P.2d 230.
It is to be noted that the Uniform Act on Paternity does not create
a new cause of action that did not exist previously,

it merely es-

tablishes a procedural mechanism for the enforcement of a child's lor,:
recognized right of care and support from its father;
Archibald, 311 P. 2d 788 (1957)

see eg. Rees v

("This court has invariably emphasize(

the father's obligation to support his children based upon the elernen·
ary principal that the law imposes upon those who bring children int
the world the duty to care for and support them during their minorir
and dependency." id.

at 789).

Appellant argues that because he was under the age of eightEl
when this action was filed,

the action should be brought in Juvenile

-3IL>Urt

by mandate of U .C .A. § 78-3a-16(1), the Juvenile Court Act
Appellant contends that the statutory language is

clear.

Respondent agrees that the statutory language is clear;

§78-3a-16 does read in pertinent part:
"Except as otherwise provided by law, the [Juvenile)
Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in
proceedings: (1) concerning any child who has violated
any,,federal, state or local law or municipal ordinance,
It is clear from the Juvenile Court Act that the legislature, in
enacting this provision, intended for the Juvenile Court to deal
with violations of criminal laws and ordinances.

This is clearly

shown by the list of possible dispositions of a case within the
jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court. §78-3a-39 reads in pertinent
part:
"When a child is found to come within the provisions
of section 78-3a-16, the [Juvenile] Court shall so adjudicate, and make a finding of the facts upon which it
basis its jurisdiction over the child provided, however,
that in cases found to be within the provisions of
section 78-3a-16(1), findings of fact shall not be
necessary.
Upon such adjudication, the court may make the
following disposition by court order:
(1) The Court may place the child on probation or under
protective supervision ...
(2)
The court may place the child in the legal custody
of a relative or other suitable person, ...
(3) The court may vest legal custody of the child in the
state division of family services or other public agency,
department, or institution, or in a child placement agency ...
(4) The court may commit the child to the state youth
development center or other similar institution ...
(5)
The court may commit ... the child to temporary
custody of the state youth correction agency ... "

-4All of these possible dispositions show the intent of the
to provide an alternative form for rehabilitation of minors chargec
with criminal violations.

This is also reflected in the exception

contained in the section cited, that no fin dings of fact are necess.
ary if jurisdiction is pursuant to §78-3a-16(1) and the Juvenile
Court's practice of not making such findings in cases where the
minor has been charged with criminal violations.

Nothing is added

to Appellant's argument through reference to other jurisdictions
in that the purpose of their statutes is the same as Utah's purpose in passing the Juvenile Court Act: alternative rehabilitation
of juveniles who have violated criminal ordinances/laws.
Appellant has consistently stated in his argument that the
Juvenile Court has "exclusive, original jurisdiction where a child
has violated any state law" and posits

that Appellant has "violated'

Utah law simply because his child's right to care and support is
being enforced pursuant to the Uniform Act on Paternity, U.C.A.
§78-45a-l et seq., and that the Juvenile Court Act does not provide
concurrent or alternative jurisdiction in some other court for such
"violation".

Appellant 's entire argument miss es the mark.

Appell-

ant has not been charged with violating any law or ordinance.

The

allegations of the Complaint filed herein are essentially that
Appellant is the father of a child born out of wedlock and that
Appellant has a duty to assist, within Appellant's ability,
support of the child.

As noted previously,

in the

this is simply the

enforcement of Appellant's moral obligation to support his child

T' -

fallacy of Appellant's argument is shown by its application to other

-5. i rrumstances where a defendant is under the age of 18 when his
act

ions give rise to legal suit:

l.

Should an individual, under

the age of 18, stay upon or in property and, thus, to use Appellant's
argument, "violate" the Unlawful Deatiner Act, U.C.A. §78-36-1,
legal action to evict such an individual would have to be brought
in Juvenile Court.

2. The lll1der 18 year old, who gets a summer

job as a laborer on a construction site and who, through his negligence, causes injury or death to an individual on the construction
site and,

thus to use Appellant's argument, "violates" the Wrong-

ful Death Act,U.C.A. §78-11-12 et seq., would have to be sued in
Juvenile Court for his liability for the injuries caused by his
acts.

3. The individual who is injured

by a product made or

designed by the enterprising, bright high-school "WIZ KID"

would have

to bring suit in Juvenile Court, since to use Appellant's argument,
the high schooler has "violated" the Product Liability Act, U .C .A.
§78-15-1 et seq.

Respondent could continue the list, e.g., claims

for personal injury and property damage arising from traffic accidents
being filed in Juvenile Court of one if the drivers were lll1der 18
years of age, but believes its point has been made; jurisdiction of
the Juvenile Court, under U.C.A. §78-3a-16(1), occurs when a person
under the age of 18 is charged with a criminal violation.

Analogus

reasoning was done by this Court in State v. Dlll1g Hlll1g Jo, 585 P.2d
·•o4

There,

this Court noted that the actions of the minor child

''ere violations of no law and the asserted jurisdiction over the
Defendant was not within the purview of the Juvenile Court Acts'
jurisdictional sections.

-6Appellant himself glosses over the Juvenile Court Act's
specific language found in §78-3a-l6 which states: "excpet as othei
wise provided by law,

..

specifically, at U.C.A.

The Uniform Act on Paternity states
§78-45a-5(1), "The district court has juris-

diction of an action under this act ... "

Within the language of the

Juvenile Court Act and the Uniform Act on Paternity, this action is
within the jurisdiction of the District Court, not the Juvenile
Court.
Appellant attempts to buttress his argument by stating that
the action of the District Court will be "mechanistic and unyielding
the Court will not"refer to the age,
parents."

status or background of the

This may be due to the fact that Appellant is unable to

follow the sections of the Uniform Act on Paternity which indicate
that provisions of the other "child support" acts are availalbe for
use in actions brought under the Uniform Act on Paternity.
following these inclusionary
Court must,

By

provisions, one finds that the Distric

in setting Appellant's support obligation,

"consider all relevant factors including but not limited
to:
(a) the standard of living and the situtation of the
parties;
(b)

the relative wealth and income of the parties·

(c)

the ability of the obligor to earn;

(d)

the ability of the obligee to earn;

(e)

the need of the obligee;

(f)

the age of the parties;

(g)
the responsibility of the obligor for the support
of others."

-7,, r: ,\

§ 78-45-

7 (2)

(Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act).
CONCLUSION

The statutory language of each relevant act and the legislative purpose and intent in enacting these acts clearly show that
an action to have the father of a child provide care and support,

within that father's ability, for his child is to be brought in the
District Court, even if the father is under 18 years of age.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

of June, 1983.

TED CANNON, Salt Lake County Attorney

SANDY MOOY,
County Attorney
'
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